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Introduction
Defaults may vary within time and space. A person who speaks both English and French, who wants to know what is the time while walking in the streets of Paris, will address a stranger owning a watch in French, while when the same person faces a similar situation in New York, he will certainly use English. A person may have di erent defaults over time: In early 1993, we believed that a PLO member will strive to sabotage the state of Israel. As of late 1993, this default does not hold. A limitation of most of the systems developed so far for default reasoning is that they focus on a single reasoner in a speci c location.
There is no doubt that it is very important to be able to reason, sometimes by default, about the defaults of other agents, and in particular, about our own defaults. If an agent is trying to hide from the enemy, it should be useful for her to know what is the enemy's default strategy for searching suspects. In order to allow such a sophisticated form of reasoning, we need a language for default reasoning that allows nesting of the default operator. Most existing systems has none or very limited nesting capability.
Another issue is the pattern of reasoning adopted by most default reasoning systems (e. g. Rei80, Moo85, Sho88, KLM90]): It is assumed that a set of defaults and observations about the world are given, and then from this piece of knowledge, the agent is supposed to draw plausible conclusions. The problem with these approaches is that they do not give us any clue on how defaults are generated in the rst place. See BGHK93, Neu89] for further discussion of this issue.
In this paper we present a new logic for default reasoning that addresses the issues and limitations mentioned above. The logic we present is a variation of modal logic, and therefore we call it default modal logic (DML, in short).
Our semantics is quite simple and has a clear intuitive interpretation. Furthermore, our semantics generalizes most of the known semantics for default implication. More precisely, we introduce an abstract notion of modal semantics (capturing all known modal type semantic structures), and prove that any modal semantics of default entailment, that is sound for some basic axioms for default reasoning, is isomorphic to a structure in our semantics.
Let us brie y present the main idea behind our semantics: Several semantics for default implication interpret \If then normally " as` holds in most of the worlds in which holds'. A natural example of this theme is Pearl's system Z, Pea90] , in which this notion of`most of' is de ned probabilistically. We o er a general framework for this approach. We adopt the set-theoretical de nition of a lter as our formalization, for what the above mentioned notion of majority might be. Probabilistic interpretations of`most of', as well as many other mathematical de nitions of`large subsets' are all special cases of lters.
Following an approach pioneered by Chellas Che75] in the context of conditional logic, we shall associate with each world w and each formula a lter of subsets (of the modal universe). We then say that \ normally implies " holds in w i the set of all worlds satisfying belongs to this lter.
Another feature of our semantics is that the resulting notion of default implication is subjective; As we allow the lters to vary from one world to another, one world may use a probabilistic interpretation while, another world in the same model, may assume an`accessibility' (or 'normality') semantics, and a third world may use some type of weights on its peer worlds to de ne its own interpretation of`most of'.
The resulting semantics we get is surprisingly simple, and at the same time, extremely exible. We can easily de ne natural constraints to get sub-classes of models that characterize a wide variety of default logics.
Independently of this paper (but two years after the original publication of our work BDBE94]), Friedman and Halpern FH98] have published the notion of qualitative plausibility measure and showed that preferential structures and other semantic structures used for default reasoning can be mapped into plausibility structures, and hence can be characterized by the so called KLM axioms KLM90]. They de ne a \richness" condition, and show that any semantics that can be mapped into a set of rich plausible structures will be complete for the KLM axioms. They also explain how plausibility measures can be used for giving semantics to propositional conditional logic, and observe that the expressive power of conditional logic is needed in order to de ne semantics for default reasoning for which the KLM system is not complete. Similar to us, Friedman and Halpern show how their semantic structure can be tailored to represent di erent set of inference rules by using di erent axioms for de ning the semantic structure. Schlechta Sch97] has proved that the semantics of Friedman and Halpern is equivalent to ours. Lehmann Leh98] has suggested a generalization of Tarski's monotonic de-ductive operations and showed that it characterizes the family of operations de ned by qualitative plausibility measures and by one of our systems. We discuss plausibility structures in more detail in section 4.
The paper is organized as follows. After discussing the basic ideas in the introduction, we de ne the language and the simplest models of our logic in section 2 and 3. We then show in section 4 how we can add semantics rules in a modular fashion and get richer and richer structures. In section 4 we show that lter-based models are the most general modal structures for modeling default reasoning, in section 5 we discuss nesting of default, and in section 6 we add some conclusive remarks. To enhance the readability of this paper, we have moved most of the technical proofs to a separate section, 7, at the end of the paper.
The language
We will rst present the syntax of DML. We propose to add, to any given language, a new binary modal operator One should note that, as the operator 2 ?! is introduced as a connective of the formal language, our logic allows sentences in which this operator appears nested. We discuss the implications of this extra power of the logic in section 5.
The models
In this section we preset our semantics. In the rst subsection we introduce the basic structures -the lter based models. Then, in the following subsec-tions, we show how, by imposing various constraints on these models, they may be tailored to match a wide variety of deduction systems. What we end up with is a sequence of semantics, all built around the same theme, that are sound and complete for a corresponding sequence of proof systems. Many of the common proof systems for default implication appear in this sequence. Most of the names of axioms and systems that we use are taken from KLM90].
Filter-based models
Just like any other modal semantics, our models are based on a set of worlds, which we call the universe. Each world in the universe represents a`possible state of a airs', i.e., it assigns a truth value to every formula of the language. The semantics of the new operator 2 ?!, combines two basic ideas which already appear in the literature. The rst idea, taken from modal logic, is that each world has a collection of`relevant subsets' of the universe. A composite formula, say 2 , is de ned to hold in a world w if the collection of worlds satisfying is one of the subsets relevant for w. Chellas Che80,  Chapter 7] calls these models \minimal models", while Bull and Segerberg call them \neighbourhood frames" and attribute their invention to Scott and Montague BS84, Section 21] Since here we are interested in giving a meaning to a binary operator, each world in our model will have a collection of relevant pairs of subsets of the universe. The second idea we employ mimics \conditioning" in probability theory. in order to evaluate the truth value of a default statement \If then normally ", we focus on the set of all worlds that satisfy . The validity of this default implication is determined by the set of worlds satisfying and the set of worlds satisfying both and . Intuitively, normally implies whenever a majority among the worlds satisfying satisfy as well.
The next question is then: Given a set of worlds, what subsets of this set can be viewed as a majority? Many useful notions of majority in all areas of mathematics fall under the abstract de nition of a lter. In particular, for every probability space, the set of all probability-one events is a lter, in every topological space, the set of all co-meager subsets is a lter, and, in the set of natural numbers, the collection of all co-nite subsets is a lter.
Before going ahead and applying this notion for our purposes, let us recall its precise de nition. Our semantics associates a lter, over the set of worlds of the model, with every world w and every sentence . To determine whether` normally implies ' holds in w, one checks whether the set of worlds satisfying is a member of the lter associate with w and the set of worlds satisfying . As a set A may have many di erent lters de ned over it, our models allow the exibility of choosing di erent lters for di erent worlds. This enables the re ection of various realistic considerations in the formation of default knowledge bases. For example, at one world a lter may be picked so as to represent subsets of worlds that he \sees", another world may give higher weight' to subsets of the worlds which are closest to it in time or in space, etc. In the sequel we will see how other systems that commit to a more speci c criteria for distinguishing between worlds (e. g. Pearl's system Z Pea90]) can be embedded in our framework. We can now de ne the models formally:
De nition 3.2 (Filter-Based Model) Given a set of propositional variables, V. A lter-based model (FBM) consists of three components: U, , and N, such that the following holds:
1. U is an arbitrary set. U is called the universe and elements of U are called worlds.
2. : U 7 ! 2 V is a labelling function, associating with every world in the universe the set of propositional variables that hold in that world.
3. N is a function, assigning to every w 2 U and to every A U, a set of subsets of U, denoted N w (A), such that A 2 N w (A) and N w (A) is a lter over U.
Note that since A 2 N w (A), the subset fA T B:B 2 N w (A)g of N w (A) is a lter over A.
To de ne the truth value function in such models we would like to use the following notation:
Notation: Given a lter-based model, M =< U; ; N >, and formula , let M j = w denote that holds in w. Let us also denote the set of all worlds (in U) in which holds by k k. De nition 3.3 (Semantics) Given a model, M =< U; ; N >, a world w in U and a sentence, , in the language of DML, the truth value of in w is de ned inductively as follows:
The propositional connectives are interpreted as usual. E.g., M j = w :
Note that defaults can vary between worlds, or in other words, that we allow for \subjective" defaults: it might be the case that in the same model, a default implication, 2 ?! , holds in one world, and fails in another.
There is one technical point we would like to mention brie y; Looking at the above de nition, one may notice that, for the purposes of de ning a semantics, among all subsets of U only those of the form k k play a role. Such sets are called de nable sets and they are usually only a negligible minority (cardinality-wise) of the set of all subsets of U. The theory of lters allows the restriction of the de nition to such sub-collections of sets (such collections, being closed under boolean set operations, are called boolean algebras). We shall take advantage of this exibility and assume that all the subsets of a universe U that we care about are de nable (i.e., of the form k k for some in the language).
The basic proof system
We now turn to the discussion of various proof systems for DML. We shall show that our basic semantics can be modulated to match a wide range of such systems.
We begin by introducing the logical system that seems to re ect the basic properties of a notion of implication. In particular, this proof system, denoted by F, is (strictly) weaker than the weakest system o ered by KLM90] for a notion of default implication. It turns out that the system F is sound and complete with respect to the class of all FBM's.
De nition 3.4 (The logical system F) Axioms: Classical Theorem 3.6 The logical system F is sound and complete for the family of lter based models.
In the theorem above and in all subsequent results on soundness and completeness of some proof system , we refer to soundness and completeness in the extended sense, that is, soundness and completeness means that for every theory T and a sentence , T` i for every model and for every world w in the model, if M j = w T then M j = w .
A hierarchy of implication relations
In this section we list several inference rules that have been suggested in the literature (See for example KLM90]) as properties that a default implication may be required to comply with. We match up each of these rules with a corresponding set-theoretic requirement of the class of FBMs. We prove characterization results that show that these correspondences are tight.
While all the speci cations of the neighbourhood function N, in the definition of general FBMs, dealt with each collection N w (A) on its own, the following requirements regulate the connections between di erent lters associated with the same world (i.e., N w (A) and N w (B) for any xed w). In section 5, when we discuss possible nesting rules, we'll have to impose requirements relating the N w s of di erent w's.
The table in gure 1 displays some of these pairs { an inference rule and its associated semantic requirement. The formulas in the semantic requirement column should be read as universal, i.e, each rule demands that its formula holds for all w's, A's and B's.
The symbol UC in the table in gure 1, stands for upward continuity, DC stands for downward continuity, RBC stands for reasoning by cases, GTS stands for general to speci c, and CM stands for cautious monotonicity. The last inference rule in the table, Mon, is the monotonicity condition, the exact rule that any non-monotonic implication relation should violate. We bring it here just for completeness. 4 Some general considerations leading to our semantics
Modal logic is a common tool for modeling default reasoning. In this section we prove that lter based models are the most general modal logic for that purpose. That is, any modal semantics that satis es the basic default rules can be presented, in a natural way, as a lter based semantics. In several systems for default reasoning, defaults are modeled by a binary relation with the intended meaning of default implication 2 . These systems include the preferential logics of Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor KLM90], the conditional logics of Boutilier Bou90], system Z of Pearl Pea90], and others (e.g, Sho88] ). Each of these systems consider a \universe" which is the set of all possible worlds, and they all enforce some type of preference, or normality ordering on the universe. The default \if then normally " is then interpreted as \In the most normal worlds where is true, is true". It has been shown that these systems are closely related Bou92, Bou90, KLM90, LM92].
Chellas ( Che80, Chapter 10], Che75]) noted that systems for conditional logics can be viewed as special cases of modal logic. This observation was carried on to logics for default reasoning Bou90, Del88] . In this section we wish to analyze this phenomena further and to show that our semantics is, in some precise sense, the most general semantics for a`normally implies' modal connective. To make the above statement carry some rigorous meaning, we begin by introducing a very broad de nition for the notion of a modal connective. We do not attempt to struggle with the philosophical issues that may be involved with such a proposed de nition, we regard our de nition as just a reasonable solution to the need for a formal framework in which one may carry out our analysis.
We use the term`connective' to denote a syntactic operator ( ; : : : ; ) generating (new) formulas from n-tuples of (old) formulas in some formal language L.
De nition 4.1 (Modal Semantics)
A connective has a modal semantics (or, allowing a minor abuse of terminology,`is a modal connective') if its semantics is de ned as follows:
A model for the language is a set of`worlds', U, in which each world has its own`state of a airs' or`point of view'.
I.e., each world, w, assigns a truth value, V w ( ), to every formula , and, for every world w and formulas ( 1 ; : : :; n ), the truth value V w ( ( 1 ; : : :; n )), is a function of the truth values assigned to the 0 i s by the worlds in U. In other words, using the notation k k for the set of all worlds that satisfy , for every w 2 U and formulas , ( 1 ; : : : ; n ), the set (of worlds) k ( 1 ; : : :; n )k is a function of the sets k 1 k;:::;k n k. A modal structure, for a language with a connective ( ; : : :; ), is a tuple (U; F ( ; : : :; ); : : :), such that F maps n-tuples of subsets of U to subsets of U as above. I.e., for every ( 1 ; : : :; n ) in the language, k ( 1 ; : : :; n )k = F (k 1 k;:::;k n k).
Note that under this de nition the operators \If then normally " of KLM90, Bou90, Pea90] may all be interpreted as modal operators.
For example, in the Cumulative Models of KLM90], a semantic structure is a triple (S; l; ) where S is a set of`states', is some binary relation over S and l maps these states to sets of`worlds' in some universe set U. A statement \If then normally " holds in such a structure i in every state that all its worlds satisfy , if this state is minimal with respect to the relation then all its worlds satisfy as well. If we use ( ; ) to denote such an implication we get:
F (k k;k k) = ( U if the above condition, relating the worlds satisfying and , holds ; otherwise As another example, in system Z Pea88], a semantic structure is a pair (U; ) where U is a set of worlds and is a ranking function assigning to each world a nonnegative integer. A statement \If then normally " holds in such a structure if the minimum rank of a world that satisfy ^ is strictly lower than the minimum rank of a world that satisfy ^: . If we use ( ; ) to denote such an implication we get that in system Z (take ) to be the default connective in system Z): 
Note that the condition de ning the truth value of this implication is indeed a function on k k and k k.
It is also worthwhile to mention that, whenever the truth value of ( ; ) does not depend upon a world w (as is the case in all the above mentioned semantic frameworks), the range of the function F is just f;;Ug. This makes the nesting of the connective trivial, that is, you can easily nd a method to translate every nested formula into a non-nested formula that has the same truth value in a given structure.
Endowed with the above notation, one can naturally translate requirements for a connective, , to requirements on the function F that it induces on the subsets of a modal universe. In particular, one can easily see the correspondence between rules of the logical system P (Section 3.3) and a a The following theorem states that indeed the models presented in this paper represent the most general modal semantics that correspond to the various logical systems we have considered. Note that the proof of this theorem is immediate from the de nitions of the notions involved (note that all the set theoretic conditions relate to the boolean algebra generated by de nable sets of worlds, that is, sets of the form k k for some 2 L). Theorem 4.2 (Generality) Let ( ; ) be a binary modal connective, then:
1. satis es LE (as well as the analogous`Right Equivalence'). From a model theoretic point of view, Theorem 4.2 is a de nability result. It states that the proof systems that we discuss actually de ne the classes of all models in which the function N has the corresponding property.
The \soundness" claim of Theorem 4.2 can be applied to tailor semantics to t any given proof systems which is a subset of P. This may be done by translating the deduction rules and axioms to requirements concerning the function F and then nding a set theoretic operator that meets these demands. In Section 4.1 below we demonstrate this approach by o ering sound and complete semantics for some of the extensions of C that were proposed by KLM90].
On the other hand, the generality claim of Theorem 4.2 o ers a tool for proving the non-existence of modal semantics with certain properties (by showing the non-existence of FBMs having the characterizing set-theoretic properties).
The following example shows how part 3 of Theorem 4.2 applies to the plausibility measures approach of Friedman and Halpern FH98]: Example 4.3 Since system F of axioms is sound for plausibility structures, it follows from Theorem 4.2 that the following claim is true:
Let PL = fU;F;Pl; g be a plausibility structure for a language L. For every formula 2 L the set B = fk k : PLj = ! g is a lter in the boolean algebra fk k : 2 Lg.
We will provide a direct proof for this claim, by showing that for any formula 2 L, B satis es the three conditions of a lter. If Pl(k k) = ? then B = F, and hence it is clearly a lter in the above algebra. Assume that Pl(k k) 6 = ?. non-emptiness. Since Pl(k k) 6 = ?, and Pl(k ^: k) = Pl(;) = ?, it follows that Pl(k ^ k) > Pl(k ^: k), and so ! , and hence k k 2 B. intersection. intersection follows from Axiom A2': suppose k k 2 B and k k 2 B. So ! and ! . Since Pl( ) 6 = ?,
Hence ! ^ , and so k ^ k 2 B. monotonicity. Suppose k k 2 B. So ! , and hence:
Now, suppose that for some 2 L k k k k. Hence k ^: k k ^: k and k ^ k k ^ k. So by Axiom A1, Pl(k ^: k) Pl(k ^: k) and Pl(k ^ k) Pl(k ^ k). It follows from (1) that Pl(k ^ k) > Pl(k ^: k), and hence ! . So k k 2 B.
As a last application, let us use Theorem 4.2 to prove a generality-type result concerning the semantics of selection functions. Selection function is one of the known possible world semantics for conditional logics (see Nut84] for a survey). A selection function f assigns to a sentence and a world w a set of worlds f( ; w). A conditional ( ; ) holds at a world w just in case is true in every world in f( ; w).
Theorem 4.4 Any nite modal structure for a binary connective, say ( ; ), that is sound for the system F, is world-wise equivalent to a model in the selection functions semantics 4 .
The proof is very simple: We already know, from Theorem 4.2, that in any such semantics, for every world w, and every formula , fk k : V w ( ( ; )) = Tg is a lter (over U). Now, recall a basic fact from the theory of lters, namely that every lter over a nite set, U, is of the form fB : B Dg, for some D U (such lters are called principal lters). Our claim is now established by noticing that, whenever this lter is principal then the FBM semantics is equivalent to the`accessibility relation' semantics obtained by viewing the generating set, D of this lter, as the set of worlds f( ; w) de ning the truth value of ( ; ) in the selection function semantics.
Modal Semantics beyond preferential reasoning
We will now demonstrate how the approach of this section can be applied to provide simple semantics for several other logical systems for default reasoning. The logical systems that we will consider are the ones obtained by adding to the system P, one by one, the rules of Negation Rationality, Disjunctive
Rationality and Rational Monotonicity, that were introduced in KLM90]. As these rules are of strictly increasing power they give rise to three proof systems. For each of these systems we shall present a matching`general modal semantics'. I.e. a semantics in terms of a function F as described above. On top of being sound and complete for their respective systems, our semantics are also`most general' for these systems in the sense of Theorem 4. .
When translated into the language of the function F these rules become: The class of all FBMs obeying F-NR is sound and complete for the proof system (F + NR).
The class of all FBMs obeying F-DR is sound and complete for the proof system (F + DR).
The class of all FBMs obeying F-RM is sound and complete for the proof system (F + RM).
One should note that the above results readily extends to any of the systems discussed so far. I.e., if a class of FBM's, K, is sound and complete for some proof system, Pr, extending F, then the class of all structures in K that meet the F ? NR requirement is sound and complete for the system Pr + NR. Theorem 4.6 (Generality)
A modal structure for a binary connective ?! satis es F ? RM. Lehmann and Magidor LM92] have advocated the class of \ranked models" as a class that characterizes the logical system P S fRMg, and have discussed the relative strength of the axioms NR, DR, and RM. Theorems 4.5-4.6 provides an alternative, modular and simple semantics for the system P S fRMg, and a novel tool by which the relative strength of the axioms can be analyzed.
Nesting of defaults
One of the interesting features of our system is that it allows us to express nested defaults. For example, the following interesting axioms can be expressed in our logic:
Default Implication (DI) DI states that if a default holds then normally its material implication counterpart holds. DC states that if a default holds, then normally its contraposition holds. For example, it supports the assertion \if a criminal normally comes from a low socioeconomic class, then normally people who come from a high socioeconomic classes are not criminals". In general, these axioms are not satis ed by PFBMs, and we can show that none of them is implied by the others.
A philosophical debate whether the above axioms are appropriate is out of the scope of this paper. We will just show that by adding more constraints on the relation N in the PFBMs we can accommodate these axioms as well, once one decides that they are suitable.
The Axiom DI translates to the condition We can prove the appropriate characterization and generalization theorems for these axioms as well.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the logic DML which is obtained by introducing a binary modal operator with the intended meaning of default implication. We have de ned a general notion of a modal connective and shown that any systems in which the default connective is de ned as a modal connective is a special case of our logic. In particular, logics for default reasoning, (e. g. , KLM90, Bou90, Pea90]) may be viewed as subsystems of DML.
Our logic has several desirable features: rst, it allows full nesting of the default operator, hence providing modal logic -based semantics for nested defaults. Second, it allows us to represent local, or , subjective, defaults: each world within the same model may have its own defaults which might di er from and relate to other worlds' defaults. Third, while other default logics build their models using a notion of normal worlds, a property which depends on the contents of the worlds (i. e. the truth values of the propositions in the worlds) and determined by some initial knowledge whose origins are vague, we replace the notion of normal worlds by the concept of majority: each world is given \large" sets of worlds according to which we decide which defaults hold in the world. We do not need to know the content of the worlds in order to build a model to reason with. Fourth, we have shown that our logic is modular -it is relatively easy to strengthen the logical system and nd characterizing models for the new systems. In all the default logics mentioned above, most of the above four virtues are missing.
Structures which are similar to lter-based models were used by Chellas Che75] to provide appropriate semantics for some weak system of conditional logic. We show here that Chellas' approach can be adapted very naturally to give intuitive modular semantics for logics for default reasoning, and prove that the semantics we propose is in a very precise sense most general. De nition 7.1 (consistent theory) A theory T is consistent w. r. t. some proof system i there is no sentence such that T` and T` : . De nition 7.2 (complete theory) A theory T is complete i for every sentence either 2 T or : 2 T. Note that, if T is a complete theory then, for every , 2 T i TProof: . Proposition 7.3 1. If T is a consistent theory then there is a theory T 0 T such T 0 is complete and consistent.
Proofs of the Completeness theorems
2. If T is a consistent theory, then T S fag is consistent i T= : .
It is straightforward to see that, as all the formal theories we discuss contain propositional logic and all their formal proofs are nite, the standard proofs of the above proposition are valid in all the modal logics here.
Corollary 7.4 If T is a consistent theory and T= a then there is a complete and consistent theory T 0 such that T S f:ag T 0 .
We now turn to the proofs of theorems in this paper. Let us x a DML language L. Proposition 7.5 The following inference rule is a derived rule of the system F: De nition 7.7 (Canonical Model) Given a proof system and a theory S, the canonical model M ;S =< U; ; N > is de ned as follows: universe: U is the set of all consistent and complete theories (with respect to ) that extend S.
Lemma 7.12 (Basic Lemma) Let M be a canonical model for some proof system and some theory S. Then ] = k k, for every sentence . In other words, for every T 2 U and every sentence , M j = T i 2 T.
Proof: By induction on .
is an atom: the claim follows from the de nition of M. is : or _ : the claim follows from consistency and completeness of T. Proof: The soundness part is easy to verify. The completeness follows from the above lemma by a standard argument; Let S be a theory in our modal language and a sentence. Assume that S 6`F . By Proposition 7.3, there's a complete and consistent theory T so that S f: g T. Going to the canonical model M = M F;; , we get M j = T S f: g. As M is a lter based model, S 6 j = w.r.t. lter based models.
Consider now the table in gure 1. By the above argument, in order to prove the completeness theorem 3.7, all we have to show is that, if includes the inference rule on the left-hand side of the table then the canonical model must obey the corresponding semantic requirement listed on the right hand side. As was justi ed before, we assume that the sets A and B in gure 1 are de nable sets. 
